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Livingston: Livingston: Corporate Tax Integration

Comment
Corporate Tax Integration
in the United States:
A Review of the Treasury's
Integration StudyI. INTRODUCTION

Tax system integration is not a new concept, but it has recently received
an increased amount of discussion in the tax community. As used in this
article, tax integration describes the concept of unifying the corporate and
individual tax systems in order to insure that corporate income is taxed only
once. Congress and others in the tax community are again considering
whether or not the United States should integrate these two tax systems.
Whether to integrate is only the beginning of the debate. The determination of which detailed mechanism to be used to achieve integration is a
significant decision with far-reaching effects and implications to the economy,
the business community, and the government.
On January 6, 1992, the Treasury released its study on subehapter C'
reform entitled, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems,
Taxing Business Income Once,2 (hereinafter "Integration Study"). The
Integration Study discusses the need for integration, four integration prototype
mechanisms,3 and the policy recommendations to be considered for any
integration mechanism that may eventually be adopted. The Integration Study

* The author wishes to thank Michelle Amopol Cecil, Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, for her invaluable insight and encouragement.
1. Subehapter C, entitled "Corporate Distributions and Adjustments," comprises
sections 301-385 of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "I.R.C.") (Title 26 of the
United States Code). Subchapter C utilizes the entity concept and thus treats
corporations as separate taxpaying entities.
2. Treasury Department Report, Integrationofthe Individualand CorporateTax
Systems, Taxing Business Income Once, (4 DTR G-2 SpSupp, 1/7/92) (hereinafter
"Integration Study"). This study was required by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 634, 100 Stat. 2282 (1986) (codiftedat26 U.S.C. § 170
(1988)).
3. Integration Study, supra note 2, at v. The four integration prototype
mechanisms discussed in the Integration Study are not exhaustive. They were selected
by the Treasury to promote discussion. Id.
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is not intended to be a legislative proposal, only to encourage further educated
discussion of tax system integration.4
Part II .of this Comment summarizes the current tax system in the United
States and discusses some of its flaws. Part III will summarize the integration
prototypes and discuss their impact on distortions of the double tax regime in
light of general policy recommendations contained in the Integration Study.
Part IV will be devoted to discussing various tax commentators' views on the
subject of integration, and the paper will conclude with comments and
conclusions concerning tax system integration in the United States.
II. THE UNITED STATES TAX STRUCTURE
AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. Current United States Tax System
The tax system utilized by the United States is generally referred to as a
"classical [tax] system."' This classical system imposes tax on distributed
corporate income at least twice. The first tier of tax is at the corporate level

on corporate earnings.6 The second tier is at the shareholder level; distributed
corporate profit, in the form of dividends, is again taxed.7 Distributions that
are made between multiple unrelated corporations can possibly be taxed more
than twice.8
The concept of double taxation is easily illustrated. Corporate income is
currently taxed at a maximum rate of 35%.9 Any dividend to noncorporate
shareholders could be subjected to tax at the maximum individual rate of
39.6%," for a combined effective tax of 60.74%."

4. Id.
5. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Relation andIntegrationofIndividualand Corporate
Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717, 719 (1981).
6. See I.R.C. § 11 (1988).
7. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1988).
8. Integration Study, supra note 2, at vii. Corporate profits distributed as
dividends to corporate shareholders could be subjected to three levels of tax; once
when earned, a second time when received as dividends by the corporate shareholder,
and again when distributed to the ultimate noncorporate shareholder. This multiple
taxation is partially alleviated by the dividend received deduction available to corporate
shareholders under § 243 of the Internal Revenue Code. Corporate shareholders can
deduct 70%, 80%, or. 100% of their dividends received depending on their ownership
interest in the distributing corporation. See also STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 173 (1991).
9. See 1993 Omnibus Budget Reform and Reconciliation Act.
10. See I.R.C. § l(a)-(h) (as amended in 1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2
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Comparatively, any other income generated by an individual, even in a
similar business activity using the partnership or sole proprietorship form, is
subject to only one tier of tax.
B. Tax System Distortions
The current double tax regime in the United States is undesirable because
it distorts financial decisions of taxpayers in the marketplace. The system of
double taxation causes decisions to be based, in whole or in part, on tax
considerations, rather than on fundamental economic considerations.12
According to the Integration Study, the primary corporate financial decisions
that are distorted by tax considerations are: "(1) whether to invest in
noncorporate rather than corporate form, (2) whether to finance investments
with debt 13rather than equity, and (3) whether to retain rather than distribute
earnings."
Distortion of these decisions can lead to inefficiencies and instabilities in
the economy of the United States. The Integration Study states, "The bias
against corporate sector investments compared with investments in the
noncorporate sector reduces the productivity ofthe nation's capital investments
and reduces potential national income."' 4 Individuals who are cognizant of
the additional tax burden on corporate earnings may be motivated to invest or
operate in noncorporate forms of business. Tax consequences should not be
the overriding factor when one considers investment or form of business. The
tax consequences should be neutral," rather than determinative.
Debt financing (financing through borrowing from a lender or issuance
of corporate bonds) is generally less costly to corporations than equity
financing 6 (financing through equity interests (i.e., stock)). The primary
reason for this variance is that interest paid on debt financing is deductible by

11. This combined effective tax percentage is illustrated as follows: $100 of
income at the corporate level is subject to 35% tax, or $35. This theoretically allows
$65 to be distributed to shareholders as dividends. The $65 would be subject to the
maximum shareholder rate of 39.6%, or another layer of tax equal to $25.74. Thus,
the original $100 of income was first subjected to $35 of tax, then $25.74 for a

combined tax of $60.74 on $100, or 60.74%.
12. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 3.
13. Id
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 12. Tax neutrality is one of the main goals of integration as stated in
the Integration Study. Id. At present, tax consequences make the noncorporate forms
of business (e.g., partnerships, subchapter S corporations, limited liability companies,
and sole proprietorships) popular, in large part due to the avoidance of the double tax
levied on corporate income.
16. Id at 6.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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the corporation, 7 while dividends paid on equity are not deductible. This
disparity has led to a trend in the United States for corporations to repurchase
substantial amounts of equity and utilize debt financing as an alternative. 8

This trend has led to a postwar high in corporate net interest expense in 1990,
equaling nineteen percent of corporate cash flow. 9 These relatively heavy
debt burdens may weaken some corporations' financial stability to such an

extent that they are forced into federal bankruptcy courts."0
Corporations may also be motivated to retain earnings or structure
distributions in a manner that avoids the double tax." A retained earnings
strategy dictates that "corporate profits are not distributed as dividends, but
retained and reinvested in the business for growth, with shareholders
ultimately realizing the resulting stock appreciation on disposition of their
shares."
This strategy is most popular when the capital gains rate is
favorable to shareholders and the corporate tax rate is lower than the
individual tax rate.2
Corporate distributions may also be structured so that earnings are paid
out as deductible interest, rather than nondeductible dividends. The best way
to accomplish this goal is to replace equity (corporate stock) with debt
Corporations have increased their share repurchases
(corporate bonds).'
from $1.2 billion (or 5.4% of dividends) in 1970 to $47.9 billion (or 34% of
In "1990, over one-quarter of corporate interest
dividends) in 1990.2
attributable
to the substitution of debt for equity through share
payments were
'26
repurchases.
Double taxation is also faulted with disrupting the general policies of tax
2
An environment
equity and administrative simplicity for the tax systemY.
of tax inequity among taxpayers results from the violation of the economic
principle of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity is the concept that similarly

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See I.R.C. § 163 (1988).
Integration Study, supra note 2, at 8.
Id at 10.
Id.
at 11.
Id.
at vii.

22. CuRTIs J. BERGER & PETER J. WIEDENBECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PARTNERSHIP TAxATION § 1.01 (1989). See also BORIS I. BrrTKER & JAMES S.

EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

1.02,

at 1-4 (5th ed. 1987).
23. BERGER & WIEDENBECK, supra note 22,

§ 1.01.

24. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 18.

25. Id at vii.

26. Id.
27. Scott A. Taylor, CorporateIntegration in the FederalIncome Tax: Lessons
From the Past and a Proposalfor the Future, 10 VA. TAX REV. 237, 242 (1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2
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situated individuals pay like amounts of tax. The principle of horizontal
equity is violated by double taxation, because an individual's stock investment
results in income potentially being exposed to an effectively higher rate of tax
of 60.74%, as opposed to the maximum 39.6% individual rate of tax endured
by other investments.' The policy of administrative simplicity is thwarted

when tax is collected at the corporate level, distributions are traced to
shareholders, and then tax is again collected at the shareholder level.29

C. Policy Recommendations
The following policy recommendations were suggested in the Integration
Study and intended to apply to any integration plan ultimately adopted:3
[1] Integration should not result in the extension of corporate tax
preferences to shareholders.3 '
[2] Integration should not reduce the total tax collected on
corporate income allocable to tax-exempt investors.32
[3] Integration should be extended to foreign
shareholders only
33
through treaty negotiations, not by statute.
[4] Foreign taxes paid by U.S. corporations should not be
treated,
by statute, identically to taxes paid to the U.S. Govern34
ment.

28. Id For this example, the current tax rates have been substituted for the rates
used by Professor Taylor.
29. Id See generally,Taylor, supra note 27, at 246-56.
30. Integration Study, supra note 2, at viii.
31. Id Corporate tax preferences are items that receive favorable tax treatment
under the Code which generally deviate from standard accounting rules. Examples
include: accelerated depreciation, deferred income recognition rules, or credits
available only to corporations. Id at 63. This guideline is based on policy and
revenue concerns, and generally has been adopted by most countries with an integrated
system; Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Japan are exceptions. Id.
at 64.
32. Id at ix. This is designed to ensure that business profits paid to tax-exempt
entities do not escape all taxation under integration. Id Tax-exempt entities include
two general types: (1) pension funds, 401(k) plans, and similar plans; (2) charities,
hospitals, educational and religious institutions. Id.
at 67.
33. Id at ix. According to the Integration Study, "[tihis is required to assure that
U.S. shareholders receive reciprocal concessions from foreign tax jurisdictions." Id.
34. Id According to the Integration Study, "[a]bsent this limitation, integration
could eliminate all U.S. taxes on foreign source profits in many cases." Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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HI. INTEGRATION PROPOSALS
The Treasury Integration Study details the mechanics of four integration
prototypes and discusses their impact on the tax distortions in light of
accomplishing integration within the policy recommendations. See Appendix
A for a comparison of the four principle integration prototypes.
A. DividendExclusion Prototype
The first prototype discussed is a dividend exclusion prototype, which is
the integration mechanism eventually favored by the Integration Study."
This prototype allows shareholders to exclude from their gross income all
corporate dividends they receive.36 Corporations would continue to pay the
same tax under existing corporate tax laws." Corporations would also be

required to maintain an Excludable Dividends Account (EDA) in order to
track the corporate income on which corporate taxes have been paid.38
According to the Integration Study, "the dividend exclusion prototype would
apply the corporate tax rate.., to both distributed and retained income, but
would eliminate the shareholder level tax on dividends paid from fully-taxed
corporate income. All other distributions, e.g., interest and return of capital,
would be taxed in the same manner as under current law."39 At some point,
dividends could become includable in shareholders' gross income; this would
occur after the corporation's EDA, which represents fully-taxed corporate
income, was depleted.' This inclusion is necessary to ensure that dividends
free'from all levels of tax are not paid from corporate preference income4 '
or untaxed foreign source income.42 The EDA is increased when a corporation pays taxes or receives excludable dividends from other corporations.43

35. Id. at 15, 17.
36. Id.
at 17.
37. Id
38. Id.
39. Id.Although not addressed in the Integration Study, one may assume that
current and accumulated earnings and profits accounts would still be maintained along
with the EDA, due to their differences in purpose. Earnings and profits accounts are
maintained to measure to the extent that a distribution is made from a corporation's
economic income. See also BrrrKE & EUSTICE, supra note 22, 7.03-.04.
40. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 17.
41. See supra note 31.
42. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 19.
43. Id at 20.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2
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It is correspondingly reduced when a corporation receives a tax refund or pays
dividends.'
The Integration Study states, "[t]he principal advantage of the dividend
exclusion prototype is its simplicity and relative ease of implementation."4
A small and relatively reasonable burden would be placed on corporations to
track distributions and manage their EDAs. Implementation could be achieved
almost instantly with very little change to existing law.46 This mechanism
may also be favored due to its functional similarity to the corporate dividends
received deductions available under § 243 of the Code.47
The impact of this prototype on the three tax distortions48 is as follows.
Dividend exclusion, by reducing the total tax on corporate earnings to the top
corporate rate, "would narrow (but not eliminate) the rate differential between
distributed corporate and noncorporate equity income and between corporate
equity income and interest., 49 If this proposal were implemented, corporations would not be as motivated to favor debt over equity, because equity
financing would no longer be subject to the present effective tax rate of
60.74%.50 Moreover, this prototype would likely result in making the
subchapter C form of entity organization more attractive than it is at
present5 ' and place it on more equal footing, from a tax perspective, with

44. Id.

45. Id. at 17.
Section 61(7) of the Code would be deleted to exclude corporate
46. I
dividends from the definition of gross income. Other Code sections and regulations
would need to be added to govern the corporation aspects and the EDA. See generally
id. at 17-25.
47. See supranote 8. The corporate dividends received deductions of § 243 of
the Code were intended to encourage corporate investment in other affiliated
corporations. Under § 243 corporations are generally allowed a deduction equal to 70%
of the amount received as dividends from a domestic corporation. The deduction
percentage increases to 80% or 100% when the receiving corporation owns greater
than 20% or 80%, respectively, of the distributing corporation. See I.R.C. § 243
(Supp. III 1991).

48. See supra text accompanying note 13.
49. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 18.

The rate differential between

distributed corporate and noncorporate equity income would not be completely
eliminated since there still is a disparity between the maximum individual rate and the
maximum corporate rate.
50. See supra note 11.

51. The corporate subchapter C form of entity organization is unpopular because
it subjects income earned to double taxation, once at the corporate level and again at
the shareholder level. In comparison, partnership and subchapter S forms of entity
organization act as pass-through entities; therefore, income earned is only subject to
tax once. I.R.C. §§ 301,761, 1361-1363 (1988). See also BrrrKER & EuSnCE, supra
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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partnership and subchapter S forms. Dividend exclusion may also reduce the
incentive for corporations to retain, rather than distribute, earnings, "at least
to the extent that fully-taxed income can be distributed to taxable sharehold52
ers."
In reference to the Integration Study's policy recommendations, dividend
exclusion does not extend corporate tax preferences to shareholders, because
shareholders can only exclude from their income dividends made from income
that was fully taxed at the corporate level. 3 The total tax collected from taxexempt investors will not be reduced under this prototype, because it retains
the current corporate level of taxation on equity capital supplied by tax-exempt
shareholders. 4 Dividend exclusion would most likely not be extended to
foreign shareholders, nor would it treat foreign taxes paid by United States
corporations the same as taxes paid to the United States, except by treaty
negotiations. 5
Overall, a dividend exclusion prototype can accomplish a reduction of tax
distortions within the framework of the policy recommendations in the
Integration Study. This effectiveness, coupled with the simplicity and ease of
implementation, should make a dividend exclusion prototype very appealing
to lawmakers as well as taxpayers.
B. ShareholderAllocation Prototype
The shareholder allocation prototype allows a corporation to allocate all
of its income among all of its shareholders as it is earned. 6 The corporation
is still treated as a separate entity for many reporting and auditing purposes.57
Shareholders include the allocated corporate income amounts in their gross
income and reduce their corresponding tax liability with credits derived from

note 22, 11.05, 1.07.
52. Integration Study, supranote 2, at 27 (footnote omitted). Corporations would
probably be pressured by shareholders to distribute earnings to the full extent of the
EDAs, because all of the dividend income could be excluded from gross income in the
shareholders' hands. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
53. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 17.
54. Id A tax exempt organization is an organization which is exempt from tax
according to the Code. Qualified retirement plans are exempt from taxation. In
addition, the Code contains a list of exempt organizations including corporations, and
any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes
and other organizations. See I.R.C. § 501(a)-(c) (1988).
55. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 17-18.
56. Id at 27.
57. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2
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allocated portions of corporate taxes paid."8 The shareholders' bases in their
stock are increased by the allocated income and reduced by the allocated
credits. 9 Any corporate distributions are first treated as a return of capital
up to the basis amount, and thereafter, as capital gain.' Thus, retained
earnings and distributed earnings are given equal tax treatment.6' This
prototype treats a corporation as an income and tax conduit, but falls short of
a pure pass-through mechanism because: (1) losses do not flow through to
shareholders; (2) the corporate level tax is retained; (3) corporations only
report aggregate income amounts, rather than reporting items separately; and
(4) tax integration benefits are not extended to tax-exempt shareholders or to
foreign shareholders, except by treaty.62 The following example demonstrates this prototype:
A corporation has three classes of common stock, the terms
of which provide for the allocation of 30 percent of corporate
income to Class A, 20 percent to Class B, and 50 percent to
Class C. The corporation has taxable income of $100, pays $31
in corporate tax and pays a $10 dividend with respect to Class
C stock. The shareholder integration prototype allocates the
income and the credit to each class of stock based on the
respective percentages (so, for example, Class C would be
allocated income of $50 and credits of $15.50). Within each
class of stock, each share receives a pro rata amount. Holders

of Class A stock would collectively increase their basis [sic] by
$20.70 (.30 x ($100-$31)), holders of Class B stock would
increase their basis [sic] by $13.80 (.20 x ($100-$31)), and
holders of Class C stock would collectively increase their basis
[sic] by $24.50 (.50 x ($100-$31)-$10).63
The shareholder allocation prototype was not favored due to its
administrative complexities and policy results.' According to the Integration
Study:
[a]dministratively, shareholder allocation integration would
require corporations and shareholders to amend governing

58. Id.
59. Id Under I.R.C. § 1012 (1988), basis of property is generally the cost of the
property, except as otherwise provided in other situations.
60. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 27.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id at 28.
64. Id at 27.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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instruments for outstanding corporate stock to provide for
income allocations, would require corporations to maintain
capital accounts similar to those used under the partnership rules,
and could create significant reporting difficulties for shareholders
who sell stock during a year and for corporations that own
stock.65
The effects of the shareholder allocation prototype on policy recommendations were also a factor leading to its disfavor. In violation of a policy
recommendation, corporate level tax preferences (e.g., tax exempt interest on
state or local bonds) would generally be extended to shareholders.6 Inorder
to maintain parity between retained and distributed earnings, this prototype
must exempt from United States tax foreign source income that has borne no
United States tax. 67 But, in harmony with the policy recommendation, there
would be no reduction of tax collected on corporate income allocated to taxexempt investors as long as the credits for corporate tax were not refundable
to this group.68
Shareholder allocation equalizes the tax rate at the maximum individual
rate across all sources of income for shareholders' equity and interest. 69 The
result is a reduction of all three tax distortions.70

C. Comprehensive Business Income Tax Prototype
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) is a prototype that
measures and taxes "the income of all business entities, including corporations

and unincorporated business ...

7
at the entity level at a 31 percent rate."1'

Under CBIT, corporations would be denied deductions for interest paid and

65. Id. The rules governing partnerships under subchapter K, §§ 701-761 of the
I.R.C., adopt a pass-through taxing model, as opposed to an entity model. Under a
pass-through model, income and deductions are allocated and pass through to the
individual partners. Capital accounts are maintained to track each partner's share of
partnership capital. The Treasury Regulations include specific requirements as to
partnership allocation in order for them to be upheld for tax purposes. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (as amended in 1992).
66. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 27.
67. Id.
68. Id at 36. The refundability of credits under the shareholder allocation
prototype is an issue that lawmakers would have to consider. If the credits were
refundable, tax-exempt investors would receive a windfall.
69. Id.
70. Id at 29.
71. Id at 40 (footnote omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2
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would also be denied deductions for dividends paid.72 Shareholders and
debtholders alike would exclude from their gross incomes dividend income
and interest income received, resulting in the equal treatment of debt and
equity.73 This prototype subjects interest and dividend income to a single
level of tax, equal to the top individual rate, at the corporate level.74
CBIT is very complex; however, it would bring about the equal treatment
of debt and equity, would tax corporate and noncorporate entities alike, and
would significantly reduce tax distortions.75 CBIT would apply to all but the
smallest businesses, regardless of corporate, partnership, or sole proprietorship
form.76 Thus, all of these business forms would be required to pay tax at the
entity level. The final result "is that one-but only one-level of tax would
be collected on capital income earned by businesses."" CBIT would be
phased in over a period of about ten years, due to its comprehensive method
of integration, and it is claimed to be self-financing.7" The CBIT prototype
is very complicated because it requires an entirely new tax regime for taxing
corporate distributions.79 The Integration Report contains a detailed discussion of this mechanism and its consequences."
D. Imputation CreditPrototype
The Imputation Credit Prototype discussed in the Integration Report
"closely resembles the system that New Zealand adopted in 1988.""81 Under
this prototype, corporations would continue to pay tax at current rates.8 2
Shareholders would include in their income the gross amount of any cash
dividend and the associated imputation tax credit for tax paid at the corporate
level.83 The tax paid at the corporate level would be tracked because the
corporation would be required to maintain an account of its cumulative federal

72. Id Interest paid is deductible under current law. I.R.C. § 163 (1988). There
is no deduction under current law for dividends paid.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Integration Study, supra note 2, at 40.
Id.
Id at 39. The details of CBIT are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Id. at 41-42.
Id at 39.
Id CBIT, as studied, would produce additional revenue over current levels.

See infra note 96.

79. Id at 39-60.
80. Id
81. Id at 95.

82. Id
83. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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income taxes paid." The credit could be used by the shareholder to reduce

tax liability down to zero, but could never result in a refund.85 This
prototype cancels out the corporate level tax, as long as the shareholders' tax
rate is at least the same as the corporate rate. 6
In the Treasury Integration Study, this prototype was discussed under a
section entitled The Roads Not Taken. 7 Although the Treasury originally
favored this type of integration mechanism due to its recent popularity in other
in creating an entirely new
countries, it was shunned due to "its complexity
88
dividends."
corporate
taxing
for
regime
E. Economic Effects of Integration
The potential economic effects from tax integration were approximated
in the Integration Study. Depending on the prototype selected, there could be
an increase of between two to eight percent in the amount of investment in
corporate capital stock.89 This would mean approximately $125 to $500
billion more in corporate capital." Corporations would also be encouraged
to reduce debt-to-asset ratios by approximately one to seven percentage
points.9' Assuming a distribution prototype, dividend payout ratios would
likely be increased to somewhere between two and six percentage points.92
The Integration Report states, "[b]y shifting resources into the corporate
sector, reducing corporate borrowing, and encouraging dividends, the
integration prototypes generate changes in economic welfare."' Overall, it
is estimated that the integration prototypes could increase economic welfare
somewhere between 0.07% to 0.73% of annual consumption, translating to a
$2.5 to $25 billion gain in the United States economy.'

84. Id
85. Id
86. Id.
87. Id. at 93.
88. Id.
89. Id at 111.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id
94. Id These figures were obtained by the Integration Report preparers using
four alternative models of the economy and two assumptions about how integration
would be financed. Id. This is the full extent of information provided as to the
calculation of these figures.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2
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F. Prototype Costs
The following are the projected revenue effects of the prototypes. 5
These figures represent the annual price of integration in lost revenue, except
in the case of CBIT, which generates additional revenue:
Dividend Exclusion
Comprehensive Business Income Tax
Shareholder Allocation
Imputation Credit

($13.1 billion)
$3.2 billion or $41 billion 96
($36.8 billion)
($14.6 billion)

It may be helpful to understand these estimates by placing them in perspective.
When compared to the forecasted 1992 fiscal deficit of $369.5 billion, the cost
of dividend exclusion is 3.5% of this deficit and shareholder allocation
amounts to 10% of this deficit.9
These estimates may be viewed as surprisingly modest, 98 but it should
be emphasizedthese costs represent annual costs, which will undoubtedly have
a cumulative impact over time. The implications of the potential revenue loss
are discussed below.
IV. TAX COMMENTATORS' VIEWS ON TAX SYSTEM INTEGRATION
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., of counsel to the firm of Womble, Carlyle,
Sandridge & Rice in Raleigh, North Carolina, argues against tax system
integration on the grounds that the United States tax system has taken many
years of fine tuning to reach its present "labyrinthine form,"' and any large,
sudden tax upheaval could create a "devil that we don't know."1" This
argument is also presented in such a way that, if tax integration is inevitably
implemented, it should deviate as little as possible from the current tax
system.' This argument is embraced by the Integration Study through its
favoring of the simple dividend exclusion prototype."°

95. Id. at 150-52.

96. The CBIT will produce $3.2 billion of revenue if there is no taxation of
capital gains on CBIT assets. The $41 billion figure represents the revenue with
current law treatment of capital gains.
97. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., 'TaxingBusiness Income Once'. Where's the Beefp
A Review and Critique of the TreasuryStudy, 54 TAX NOTES 1391, 1395 (1992).
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Id
102. Id.
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Gene Steuerle, a leading tax commentator, believes that even though tax
system integration was rejected twice in the recent past, once in the Carter
Administration 3 and once in the Reagan Administration,' its time may
be upon us.'Ou He cites four main reasons for this belief: (1) the recent past
and future increases in corporate debt; (2) "backdoor" integration through
increased use of the partnership form;"°6 (3) "the extraordinary complexity

103. The Treasury prepared a proposal which "dealt with corporate preferences
by means of a 'tracking of taxes' mechanism." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment
of Corporate Preference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative

Analysis, 44 TAX LAW. 195, 195 n.4 (1990). Representative Ullman introduced a
similar proposal in Congress. See 124 CONG. REC. 2132, 7978 (1978).
104. The Reagan Administration introduced a proposal "based on a partial
dividend deduction and a 'tracking of income' mechanism, which was included in the
1985 tax reform bill but was not enacted." Avi-Yonah, supra note 103, at 195 n.4.
See H.R. REP. No. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 426, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 231-49 (1985). See also 2 TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMIcrrY
AND GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 134-35
(1984).
105. Gene Steuerle, Is Integration of Corporate and Individual Taxes Still

Possible?, 44 TAX NOTES 229, 229 (1989).
106. "Backdoor" integration is also accomplished in some states through the use
of new limited liability companies (LLCs). These companies have some of the
attributes of the partnership form and some of the corporate form, principally, limited
liability. If the LLC is structured carefully under the entity classification rules of the
regulations, it will be taxed as a partnership. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C. B. 360.

As of 9/1/93, LLCs had been adopted by 30 states: ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601
to -857 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT.

§§ 7-80-101 to -913 (Supp. 1992);

Connecticut House Bill 6974 as amended, 1993 Regular Session (signed by governor
June 23, 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (Supp. 1992); Florida

House Bill 1703, 13th Legislature, First Regular Session 1993 (became law without
signature April 24, 1993); Georgia House Bill No. 264, 142nd General Assembly, First
Regular Session 1993 (signed by governor April 5, 1993); Idaho House Bill No. 381
as amended, 52nd Legislature, First Regular Session 1993 (signed by governor March
26, 1993); Indiana Senate Bill No. 485 as amended, 108th Legislative Session, 1993

Regular (signed by governor May 13, 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100 - .1601
(West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301 - a1369 (West Supp. 1993); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE
ANN. §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01 -.955 (West Supp.

1993); Michigan House Bill No. 4023 as amended, 87th Legislature, 1993 Regular
Session (signed by governor April 14, 1993); Missouri Senate Bill No. 66 as amended,
87th Legislative Assembly, First Regular Session (signed by governor July 2, 1993);
1993 MONTANA LAws" ch. 120 (Montana Senate Bill No. 146 as amended, 53rd
Legislature 1993 (signed by governor March 18, 1993)); Nebraska Legislative Bill No.

121 as amended, 93rd Legislature, First Regular Session 1993 (signed by governor
June 2, 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.010 - .571 (1991); New Hampshire House Bill
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2
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in administering partnership taxes;" and (4) "the prejudice in the current tax
system against new, risky ventures that must be formed as corporaions."0 7
"Backdoor" integration can occur when tax advisors stress partnership
formation rather than the corporate form over a long period of time.' 8 This
situation compounds the administrative complexities for multiple, large
partnerships, both for the partners and the Service.'O' The numerous income
tracking and reporting requirements of partnerships weave a complicated web
that creates an administrative nightmare. The prejudice Steuerle cites refers
to the fact that venture capital firms are practically forced into the corporate
form, despite the double tax burden, in order to avoid the unfettered liability
of partnerships." 0
Lost revenue from integration is an issue that is difficult to put a finger
on at this time.' Most commentators do not seem very concerned with the
potential annual revenue loss from tax integration. This insouciance may be

No. 690 as amended, 153rd Legislative Session 1993-1994 (signed by governor June
23, 1993); New Jersey Senate Bill No. 890, 205th Legislature, Second Regular Session
1993 (signed by governor July 30, 1993); New Mexico House Bill No. 448 as
amended, 41st Legislature, First Regular Session 1993 (signed by governor April 7,
1993); North Dakota Senate Bill No. 2222 as amended, 53rd Legislative Assembly,
1993 First Session (signed by governor April 12, 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 2000 - 2060 (West Supp. 1993); Oregon Senate Bill No. 285 as amended, 67th
Legislative Assembly, 1993 Regular Session (signed by governor June 24, 1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-16-1 to 7-16-75 (1992); South Dakota Senate Bill No. 139 as
amended, 67th Legislative Assembly, 1993 Regular Session (signed by governor March
22, 1993); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 1.01 - 9.02 (West 1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 48-26-102 to -157 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to 1123 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-lA-1 to 31-1A-69 (Supp. 1993).
Furthermore, LLCs are under consideration in at least ten other state legislatures. See
Alabama House Bill No. 769, 165th Legislature, 1993 Regular Session; California
Senate Bill Nos. 469, 930, 1993-94 Regular Session; Hawaii House Bill No. 863, 17th
Legislative Session, First Regular Session 1993; Maine House Bill No. 1123, 116th
Legislature, First Regular Session 1993; New York Assembly Bill No. 8676, 215th
General Assembly, First Regular Session 1993; Ohio House Bill 74, 120th General
Assembly, 1993-94 Regular Session; Pennsylvania House Bill Nos. 705, 1719, 1059,
176th General Assembly, 1993-94 Regular Session; South Carolina House Bill No.

4283, Senate Bill No. 824, Statewide Session 1993; Tennessee House Bill No. 952,
Senate Bill No. 554, 98th General Assembly, First Regular Session 1993; Washington
House Bill 1235, 53rd Legislature, 1993 Regular Session.
107. Steuerle, supranote 105, at 229.

108. Id.
109. Id
110. Id. at 229-30.

111. Loss of tax revenue arguably should be a large consideration in light of the
amount of legislation aimed at reducing the deficit and balancing the annual budget.
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the result of a belief that, if and when integration takes place, safeguards will
be used to minimize the loss of revenue.' 2 As shown by the costs of
integration above, three of the prototypes will result in between $3.1 billion
and $36.8 billion of lost revenue annually. The Integration Study did not
specifically address any revenue substitutes.
It is most probable that any tax integration prototype implemented would
be coupled with an increase in the individual tax rate to make up for any
revenue loss."' Jeffrey Kwall, an Associate Professor of Law at Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law, believes that proponents of integration
ought to evaluate any integration prototypes "from a perspective.that considers
the ramifications of an alternative revenue source."" 4 Professor Kwall
assumes that any revenue loss caused by integration must be made up and that
integration ought to be analyzed on the basis of the mechanism used to make
up this revenue. He proposes that integration would require a tax rate increase
on high-income individuals." 5 The high-income individuals would then
pressure Congress to create additional tax preferences in order to minimize
their tax liabilities." 6 These preferences and the higher tax "jeopardize the
gains in equity and efficiency" recently achieved in moving the United States
to a "low rate, broad-based income tax.""' 7 Kwall concludes that double
taxation can be "reconciled with equity and efficiency" when one considers the
adverse implications that would result from covering the projected integration
loss with revenue from other sources."
Cummings' argument is that tax system integration actually would not
lead to significant general economic welfare gains." 9 He scoffs at the
models discussed in the Integration Study, which contend that by removing tax
distortions, "economic welfare" of the United States economy can be increased
by $2.5 to $25 billion per year.' These numbers, he contends, are not all
that extraordinary in a $4 trillion domestic economy, they are not intuitively
obvious to non-economists, and they may be sharply affected by replacement
2
taxes that are conspicuously missing from the Integration Study.1 '

112. Gene Steurle, A SimplifiedIntegratedTax, 44 TAx NOTES 335, 336 (1989).
See also infra note 113.
113. Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of
CorporateIncome, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613, 638 (1990).
114. Id at 616.
115. Id at 617.
116. Id.
117. Id
118. Id
119. Cummings, supra note 97, at 1393.
120. Id
121. Id at 1393-94.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/2

16

1993]

Livingston: Livingston: Corporate Tax Integration

CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION

The American Law Institute (ALI) has done some studies on integration.
Professor Alvin Warren of Harvard Law School, the ALI's reporter on their
corporate integration project, presented the ALI's selected mechanism for
integration." The ALI's mechanism is one that treats "the corporate tax as
if it were a withholding tax paid by a corporation on behalf of its shareholders
and thus allow[s] shareholders a refundable credit for the corporate tax that
they could use against their tax due on dividends."'" Professor Warren, in
reference to a tentative draft of an ALI project,'24 has concluded that
integration is preferable in theory and workable in practice.'25
Professor James Eustice of New York University School of Law, while
attending an American Association of Law Schools (AALS) panel discussion,
stated that "there has been a great deal of integration under current law, some
of it official and some of it of the self-help variety."1 26 Eustice mentioned
several illustrations of official integration. For example, income of partnerships and Subchapter S corporations is subject to only one level of tax.
Eustice expects the rules for S corporations"27 to become more lax and to
eventually cover all but publicly traded corporations. 28 He also noted a

122. Calvin H. Johnson, IntegrationDiscussionHighlightsAALS Meeting in San
Antonio, 54 TAX NOTES 114, 114 (1992).
123. Id. This was one of four approaches considered by the ALL. The other

three approaches are: (1) "repeal both the corporate tax and the realization convention
and tax shareholders on increases in the value of unsold shares that are due to
corporate earnings; [(2)] tax such corporations as partnerships and S corporations and
pass through earnings to the shareholders; [and (3)] exclude dividends from
shareholder tax." Id.
124. ALl FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TENTATiVE DRAFT No. 2, SUBCHAP(1979).
125. Warren, supra note 5, at 772. Prbfessor Warren, serving as Reporter,
authored a recently released study as part of the ALI's Federal Income Tax Project.
See ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
TER C- CORPORATE DISTRaBuTIoNs

CORPORATE INCOME TAxES, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION

(1993) (hereinafter "Reporter's Study"). This study advocates integration via "a
shareholder credit for corporate taxes previously paid with respect to corporate income
distributed as dividends." Id. at xv. This mechanism is similar to the Imputation
Credit Prototype dismissed in the Integration Study for its complexity and creation of
a new tax regime. See supra text accompanying note 88. Warren states that, "the
Treasury report [Integration Study] and this [ALl] study should be considered

complementary, in that they develop different legislative responses to the problems of
current law." Reporter's Study at 11.
126. Johnson, supra note 122, at 115.
127. "Small business corporations" that meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 1361
can elect S corporation status. S corporations are limited to one class of stock and a
limit of 35 shareholders, among other requirements. I.R.C. § 1361 (1988).
128. Johnson, supra note 122, at 115.
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very popular "new game in town" in reference to Wyoming limited liability
companies, which are treated as partnerships for tax purposes." 9 Eustice
summarized that "[1]imited-liability companies are super S corporations in
which shareholders can participate in management without forfeiting their
limited liability or their tax rights as partners.' 3 0 Mutual funds, regulated
investment companies, real estate investment trusts, and real estate mortgage
conduits also enjoy official corporate integration in the form of receiving a
deduction for dividend distributions made to their shareholders., Allowing
consolidated returns among corporations avoids the possible multi-levels of
tax.132

Professor Eustice also pointed out that corporations often effectuate selfhelp integration by making distributions in the form of salaries, rent, tax
3
1 In some
deductible interest, or royalties, rather than as straight dividends.
3
1
dividends.'
disguised
be
actually
may
instances, these payments
Overall, Professor Eustice believes that integration is a costly process and
would require taxes in other areas to be self-financing.'35 He argues for
"small, incremental changes,"'3 6 because "Congress is capable of butchering
the technical aspects of a tax revision ... and integration will be multisection
37
legislation affecting all questions in the taxation of corporations."'
Professor Scott Taylor of the University of New Mexico School of Law
urged Congress to look at historical examples of integration in the United
States to determine if any of the past mechanisms can "provide valuable
lessons for the future."'3' Taylor contended that "the United States has had
a pure, classical, double corporate tax for only 28 of the 87-year history of the
tax."'3
He therefore suggested that integration has always been an illdefined goal of lawmakers, who allowed partial integration in many different

129. Id The limited liability corporations qualify as partnerships for tax purposes
because they achieve a 2-2 tie under the factors of Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2
(as amended in 1983). See also supra note 106.
130. Id
131. Id See alsoI.R.C. §§ 561, 852(b) (1988) (regulated investment companies),
and §§ 562, 857(b) (1988) (real estate investment trusts).
132. Johnson, supra note 122, at 115. See also I.R.C. §§ 1502, 1504 (1988).
133. Johnson, supra note 122, at 115.
134. BrrrKE &EusTiCE, supranote 22, 1.03, at 1-8. For a general discussion
of disguised dividends treatment in practice, see CuRTIs J. BERGER & PETER J.
WIEDENBECK, PARTNERSHIP TAXAnON

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

14 (Model 2) (1989).

Johnson, supra note 122, at 115-16.
Id at 115.
Id at 116.
Taylor, supra note 27, at 239.
Johnson, supra note 122, at 115.
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forms and models, without much of a comprehensive, concerted effort.14
After reviewing all of the integration mechanisms of the past, Taylor
concluded that "[t]he largest obstacle hindering enactment of an integration
He did not doubt congressional
plan is the looming federal deficit."''
incentive for passage of any integration plan that would increase revenue, but
intuitively observed that most workable integration plans lose moderate to
large amounts of revenue.'42
One of the core arguments advanced in favor of tax system integration
in the United States is that all of our major trade partners have some form of
This argument implies that tax system integration is the
integration.'
modem format for a tax system among the world's major economic countries.
In his one-paragraph transmittal letter to Congress, Kenneth Gideon, former
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, used this argument as the sole
justification for integration.'" However, one commentator noted that the
"everyone else is doing it" argument should not alone be sufficient to compel
45
United States tax system integration.
Although release of the Integration Study was a big step towards tax
integration in the United States, some -congressional aides on tax writing
committees believe that legislative action is years down the road.'"

V. COMMENT
The Treasury's Integration Study has served its stated purpose of
stimulating discussion of tax system integration; however, a substantial amount
of additional effort needs to be expended to determine the best approach to
integration in the United States before a final decision can be made. The
integration effort should be a concerted one, rather than the limited, sporadic
efforts made by different tax groups at different times in the past.

140. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 260-97 (discussing the integration models of
the past).
141. Id.at 310.
142. Id.
143. Integration Study, supranote 2, at 2. Japan, however, recently returned to
the classical unintegrated system in 1989. Id at 159.
144. Cummings, supranote 97, at 1391 n.4. The transmittal letter is a type of
cover letter to Congress and it accompanied the Integration Study.
145. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 103, for an overview of major countries'
integration systems.
146. Tax Committeesto Look at CorporateIntegration,But Aides See No Action,
BNA (6 DTR G-2, 1/9/92). This sentiment is shared by former Treasury Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy Kenneth Gideon. Integration of Corporate and Individual
Tax Systems is Desirable, Treaswy Says, BNA'(4 DTR G-2, 1-7-92).
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Further discussion of the feasibility of integrating the tax system in the
United States should focus on three main aspects of any integration mechanism:
(1) the complexity of the integration mechanism and the amount of
deviation from current tax law, considering the concept of administrative ease;
(2) the success of the integration mechanism in achieving the goal of tax
neutrality and the reduction of the financial decision distortion cased by the
classical tax system; and
(3) the revenue loss (cost) of the integration mechanism and the possible
replacement taxes to cover the revenue loss.
First, the complexity of any integration mechanism and the deviation
from current tax law is a very important aspect. Tax law in this country is a
creature that has evolved slowly over the years and has reached its present
state as a result of many competing interests. It would be foolish to think that
the entire tax system could be instantly overhauled with the stroke of a pen
and not result in the defeat of multiple taxpayers' expectations. It would be
rational for persons to fear the unknown economic possibilities of their actions
in a radically new tax environment. This view militates against the more
complicated prototypes. The Shareholder Allocation prototype is administratively complex. The Comprehensive Business Income Tax is also complex
and would require a concerted implementation effort over a period of
approximately ten years. The Imputation Credit is complicated because it
creates an entirely new tax regime for taxing corporate dividends. The
Dividend Exclusion Prototype is the most attractive integration mechanism due
to its relative simplicity, its ease of implementation, its relatively small change
from the current tax system, and its relatively low cost.
The administrative ease of maintaining, as opposed to implementing, a
new tax system should also be considered in the discussion of complexity.
There is a strong incentive to steer tax law into the smooth waters of
administrative ease rather than allowing the tax system to become mired in
uncertainty and noncompliance due to unnecessary complexity.
Second, the ability of any integration proposal must be evaluated on its

success in achieving the stated goal of integration, neutrality,'47 and its
ability to reduce the distortion of financial decisions caused by the classical
tax system. The ability of the integration proposal to accomplish these goals
will directly determine the degree of efficiency to be realized by the economy
as a whole and by corporate and individual taxpayers as well. It is readily
apparent that each of the prototypes discussed in the Integration Study does
a fairly equal job of accomplishing tax neutrality, 48 but often using vastly

147. Integration Study, supra note 2, at 12.
148. See supra note 15.
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different avenues. Therefore, this policy of tax neutrality should be given less
weight if one is deciding only among these four prototypes.
Third, the cost of achieving integration, in order to reap its benefits, must
be considered in light of any replacement taxes used to cover any revenue
loss. Several commentators gave this consideration considerable weight. In
light of the ever increasing deficit, lawmakers would be foolish to attempt to
effectuate tax integration at a substantial cost to the national treasury. It
should be noted that the prototype costs stated above are recurringannual
costs, as opposed to one time costs. It seems fairly obvious that some type of
revenue substitute will have to be implemented to cover the prototype cost.
Unfortunately, many commentators have glossed over the discussion of any
replacement taxes. Professor Kwall realized the significance of this aspect of
integration when he placed the discussion of integration into the context of
considering the ramifications of alternative revenue sources. 49 It would be

a grave error to cancel out the efficiencies of integration with an ill-advised
replacement tax. This aspect of integration needs to be given considerable
weight when integration prototypes are discussed.
The Integration Study is correct in its conclusion that the Dividend
Exclusion Prototype is the most attractive mechanism at this time. Congress
could possibly experiment with this prototype, in order to determine if the tax
distortions are actually reduced and the benefits are actually derived as
predicted. One manner of experimentation could use a phase-in of the
dividend exclusion for individual taxpayers, for example, a 20% exclusion in
year one, a 40% exclusion in year two, and a final phase-in of the dividend
exclusion at the end of year five. 5 This model would give legislators,
corporations, and individuals an opportunity to adjust to the new economic
climate brought about by integration. A phase-in would also provide the
opportunity for timely corrective adjustments needed to keep integration on
its planned course. The teeth of a sudden revenue bite caused by the
prototype's cost would also be dulled and any replacement tax could be
phased in at the same time to cover the cost.
At this juncture of the integration debate, a driving force is needed to
actually bring about integration in the near future. The most likely candidate
for this role is the business community. The proliferation of limited liability

companies (LLCs) among the states' has made tax integration imperative

149. Kwall, supra note 113, at 616-17.
150. For example: a taxpayer receiving $100 of corporate dividends would be
able to exclude $20 from income in year one, $40 in year two, $60 in year three, $80
in year four, and all $100 in year five. The amount of exclusion is figured assuming
the corporations had sufficient amounts in their Excludable Dividends Accounts (EDA)
to cover these dividends.
151. See supra note 106.
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for coporations. With LLCs, investors' returns are subject to only one layer
of tax, since LLCs are taxed as partnerships if properly structured. 5 2 New
businesses will find LLCs very attractive in relation to the traditional
subchapter C form of organization. Without integration, subchapter C
organizations will virtually be left behind as the dinosaur whose earnings are

subject to two layers of tax.
Corporations should make integration a short term goal. The most viable
means of accomplishing this goal is through a concerted lobbying effort. The
Integration Study has laid the preliminary groundwork, corporate America
must now make known its wish to have integration implemented.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax system integration in the United States will result in economic
efficiencies and benefits derived from tax neutrality, the placing of equity and
debt financing on a level playing field, and making the subchapter C form of
business more attractive in relation to the partnership and subchapter S forms.
However, the mechanism used to realize these benefits must be judiciously
considered and carefully implemented.
The two main hurdles to integration at this time are complexity and cost.
Excessive complexity results in inefficiency and uncertainty in the marketplace. Thus, simplicity is an indispensable element of a workable integration
model. The cost of any integration prototype will undoubtedly need to be
covered by some type of replacement tax. The interrelation between the
replacement tax, the prototype, and the projected benefits and costs of
integration warrants further study.
The Integration Study has started the ball rolling for tax system
integration in the United States. Concerted effort between the Treasury and
outside groups, such as the ALI, could bring the goal of integration, in
whatever finalized form, to reality.
JOHN LIVINGSTON

152. See supra note 106.
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APPENDIX

A153

Comparison of the four principal integration prototypes
Prototype
Imputation
Credit
Prototype

Dividend
Exclusion
Prototype

Shareholder
Allocation
Prototype

a) Distributed
Income

Corporate
Rate

Shareholder
54
rate1

CBIT rate

Shareholder
54
rate

b) Retained
Income'

Corporate
rate
(additional
shareholder
level tax
depends on
the treatment
of capital
gains; see
Chapter 8)

Shareholder
rate

CBIT rate
(additional
investor level
tax depends
on the treatment of
capital gains;
see Chapter
8)

Corporate
rate (additional shareholder level
tax depends
on the treatment of
capital
gains; see
Chapter 8)

Treatment of
non-corporate
businesses

Unaffected

Unaffected

CBIT applies
to noncorporate
businesses as
well as
corporations,
except for
very small
businesses.

Unaffected

Issues

CBIT
Prototype

Rates

153. Integration Study, supra note 2, at x.
154. Plus 3 percentage points of corporate level tax not creditable because the
prototype retains the corporate rate but provides credits at the shareholder rate.
155. Assuming no DRIP. See Chapter 9.
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Comparison of the four principal integration prototypes
Prototype
Issues

Dividend
Exclusion
Prototype

Shareholder
Allocation
Prototype

Corporate tax
preferences

Does not
extend
preferences
to
shareholders.
Preference
income is
subject to
shareholder
tax when
distributed,

Extends
preferences
to shareholders.

Does not
extend preferences to
investors.
Preference
income is
subject to
compensatory
tax or
investor level
tax when
distributed.

Does not
extend preferences too
shareholders.
Preference
income is
subject to
shareholder
tax when
distributed.

Tax-exempt
investors

Corporate
equity
income
continues to
bear one
level of tax.

Corporate
equity income continues to
bear one
level of tax.

A CBIT
entity's
equity income and
income used
to pay interest bear one
level of tax.

Corporate
equity income continues to
bear one
level of tax.

Foreign source
income

Foreign
taxes are
creditable at
the corporate
level, but
shielded income is subject to shareholder when
distributed.

Foreign
taxes are
creditable at
the corpo.rate level
and at the
shareholder
level,

Foreign taxes
are creditable
at the entity
level, but
shielded
income is
subject to
compensatory
tax or an
investor level
tax when
distributed.

Foreign
taxes are
creditable at
the corporate level,
but shielded
income is
subject to
shareholder
when
distributed.

CBIT
Prototype
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Comparison of the four principal integration prototypes
Prototype
Imputation
Credit
Prototype

Dividend
Exclusion
Prototype

Shareholder
Allocation
Prototype

Foreign
investors

Corporate
equity
income
continues to
bear tax at
the corporate
level and
current withholding taxes
(eligible for
treaty reduction)
continue to
apply to
distributions.

Corporate
equity income continues to
bear tax at
the corporate level
and current
withholding
taxes
(eligible for
treaty
reduction)
continue to
apply to
distributions.

A CBIT
entity's
equity income and
income used
to pay interest bear tax
only at the
entity level,
and no
withholding
taxes are
imposed on
distributions
to equity
holders or on
payments of
interest.

Corporate
equity income continues to
bear tax at
the corporate level
and current
withholding
taxes
(eligible for
treaty
reduction)
continue to
apply to
distributions.

Treatment of
debt

Unaffected

Unaffected

Equalizes
treatment of
debt and
equity

Unaffected
(unless
bondholder
credit system adopted)

Issues

CBIT
Prototype
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